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SOUTH CAROLINA AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 2
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1951 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form Laws drafted the Uniform Commercial Code. Since the
Code was initially drafted, it has been enacted by every state
except Louisiana. Each state which has enacted the Code has,
however, made some non-uniform amendments. The vast ma-
jority of the South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code
amendments are found in Article 2 of the Code, and these
amendments will be discussed in this article.
Although South Carolina has its own reporter's comments
parallel to those of the official editorial board, these comments
were written prior to the adoption of the amendments. They
do not, therefore, reflect the reporter's views or interpretations
of the amendments.
II. EFFECT OF CHANGING AN IMPLIMD WARRANTY TO AN
EXPRESS WARRANTY-SEcTIONS 2-313(1) (a) and 2-314(2)(f)
The Code divides warranties into two categories-express and
implied. While these are the same terms as used for pre-Code
warranties, they do not encompass the same concepts. Under
section 2-314, implied warranties are always given when the
product is sold by a merchant. The express warranties under
section 2-313, however, are given only when a statement con-
cerning the product or a sample or model of the product is
made a part of the basis of the bargain regardless of the status
of the seller. In amending sections 2-313 and 2-314, the South
Carolina Legislature took an implied warranty 1 -that goods must
conform to any affirmation of fact made on the container or
label-and made it an express warranty.2
It is necessary to compare this amendment with the meanings
given express and implied warranties by the Code framers in
order to show the significance, or lack of significance of this
1. UNIFoRm CommERCAL CODE § 2-314(2) (f) (1962 version).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 102-313(1) (a) (Supp. 1966).
1
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change. First, consider the pre-amendment distinction that im-
plied warranties are given by merchants, while express war-
ranties are given by anyone who sells a product. On its face the
South Carolina amendment may seem to extend the effect of a
warranty given on a container or label and to create an express
warranty where none was intended. An examination of the pre-
requisites for an express warranty, however, will show that such
expansion is illusory. A statement of fact on a container or
label does not of itself create an express warranty. The fact
so stated must become a part of the basis of the bargain. This
is true under the original Code and under the South Carolina
amendment. The South Carolina legislature did not amend the
Code so that an express warranty arose whenever the product
is sold with a statement of fact on the container or label; they
still retained the basis of the bargain test.
The pre-Code case of Beckett v. F. V. -Woolworth Co.8 may be
used to demonstrate the result that will apparently be reached
in South Carolina after the amended Code. In Beckett, the
plaintiff sought to recover for damages sustained when the
mascara which she purchased failed to be either "run proof" or
"harmless" as stated on the label. Under the Uniform Sales Act,
in order to create an express warranty, the plaintiff was re-
quired to prove that she had relied upon the statements on the
container or label.4 She was unable to prove such reliance.
Under the original Code, however, to create an express warranty
the plaintiff would be required to prove that the statements
formed a basis of the bargain. Whether the difference between
the two tests is merely a question of semantics or is a difference
of basic legal concepts is debatable. 5 Under the amended Code
3. 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E2d 427 (1941).
4. UNxuoR SALEs AcT § 12.
5. The New York Law Revision Commission in commenting on section
2-313(1) stated that the extent to which the Code changes present law is
unclear. One reason for this is the Code's failure to define "basis of the
bargain." The Commission concluded that "[p]ossibly for lack of any other
meaningful standard, courts must employ the test of whether the buyer relied
on the affirmation or promise, the test presently employed in Section 12 of
the Uniform Sales Act." I N.Y.L. REv. CoaMai'X REP. STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
CommERcIAL CODE at 392-93 (1955). As the Commission points out, however,
the Code's use of basis of the bargain rather than reliance, indicates an intent
to modify present law.
Richard Duesenberg and Lawrence King suggest that the Code does not
change the present law.
Whether one speaks of reliance or basis of the bargain, little
difference exists between the two. In neither case should the
statement be required to have been the sole factor leading the
1969]
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in South Carolina the plaintiff in an identical suit, would also
have to prove that the statements formed a basis of the bargain.
Under the original Code, however, rather than proving an
express warranty, the same plaintiff, under the implied war-
ranty provisions of 2-314, would only have to prove that the
defendant was a merchant as defined by the Code6 and that
the statements were contained on the product. This seems to
be a lesser burden than proving that the statements on the
container or label formed a basis of the bargain, as required for
an express warranty under the South Carolina amendment.
The requirement that the merchant or manufacturer stand
behind any statement of fact placed on the container or label
of his product does not place him at any disadvantage. While
the comments to Section 2-314 state that the list of situations
which create implied warranties is not to be exhaustive, a South
Carolina court would be justified in excluding from this section
statements of fact contained on a label or container as this
provision was specifically removed from Section 2-314 by the
South Carolina legislature.
R]ichard W. Duesenberg and Professor Lawrence W. King in
their treatise on Article Two indicate that the inclusion of sub-
section (f) (the provision that makes a statement on a con-
tainer or label an implied warranty) in section 2-314 was
redundant, for an express warranty based on the labels would
almost always be created.7 They reason that the statement of
fact on the container or label would always be part of the basis
of the bargain and therefore become an express warranty.
Whether this statement is true is debatable for it would depend
buyer to purchase. In either case, the statement should, at least,
be one of such factors. What is really crucial is whether the state-
ment was made as an affirmation of fact, the goods did not live
up to the statement, and the defect was not so apparent that the
buyer could not be held to have discovered it for himself.
3 R. DUESENDERG & L. KING, SALES AND BuLx TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNI-
Foiai COMMERCIAL CODE § 6.01 6-2 n2 (1966).
6. UNiFoRm CoasERcAL CODE § 2-104(1) (1962 version). This section
provides:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge
or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the trans-
action or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by
his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill.
7. 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. IING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE
UNIOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.01[3][f] (1966).
[Vol. 21
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upon the proof that the statement of fact found on the con-
tainer or label formed a basis of the bargain. On the other
hand, if the statement of fact found on the container or label
created an implied warranty, this warranty would always be
given whenever the product is sold by a merchant.
The error of the South Carolina amendment can be stated in
this manner: To make the statements contained on a label or
container express warranties was unnecessary because they
would have become express warranties without being specifi-
cally mentioned when such statements of fact form a basis of
the bargain. Moreover, to take subsection (f) out of Section
2-314 could prevent statements of fact on containers or labels
from becoming implied warranties when the product is sold
by a merchant. Thus, in the case previously mentioned, the
plaintiff could have recovered on the basis of an express war-
ranty under the original Code if she had also proved the state-
ment of fact formed a basis of the bargain. The South Carolina
amendment was not needed to achieve this result.
III. DIscLAIm OF WARnANnES iN SouTm CAROLINA
A. Empress Warranties
Section 2-316(1) of the South Carolina version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code8 is the same as the 1954 version of the
Code which stated basically that an express warranty could not
be disclaimed. This section was changed in the 1962 version of
the original Code to read:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or
limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but subject to the pro-
visions of this Article on Parol or extrinsic evidence
(Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative
to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.9
The change in the wording of section 2-316(1) was made
largely to meet the objections of the New York Law Revision
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-316(1) (Supp. 1966). This section provides:
"If the agreement creates an express warranty words disclaiming it are inop-
erative."
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(1) (1962 version).
19691
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Commission'0 that the 1954 version of the section 2-316(1)
would reverse their famous (or infamous) case of Lurnbrazo v.
Woodruf." Lumbrazo involved a suit by a purchaser of what
were purported to be "Japanese onion sets." The plaintiff
sought to prove that the defendant had in fact not delivered
"Japanese onion sets" and as a result had breached an express
warranty that the onion sets delivered were "Japanese onion
sets." The defendant sought to rely on a warranty disclaimer
that excluded all warranties both express and implied. The New
York court held that the disclaimer was to be given effect and
that any express warranty of description was disclaimed.
Whether the 1962 version of the Code will save the Lumbrazo
case, however, is questionable.
One commentator said of the 1962 change of Section 2-316 (1):
I have indulged in this prologue not so much to amuse
as to justify the conclusion now proffered that it is im-
possible to predict with any degree of precision what
effect Section 2-316(1) will have . . . . Its language
says nothing; it means nothing.12
Although commenting mainly on California law, his statement
is generally applicable.
Noting that an express warranty must form a basis of the
bargain, another commentator points out that "[ilt is illogical
to allow its disclaimer."18 Dean William Hawkland generally
favors the 1962 version. He indicates however, that it will not
have the effect of saving the Lumbrazo case. 14 He gives the
example of a buyer who wishes to purchase a rebuilt 1,136 KW
General Electric generator. The buyer has on prior occasions
purchased rebuilt generators from the seller and he knows that
they generally perform well and is, therefore, willing to take
the risk of its failure to perform. If the seller were to deliver
a 1,000 KW Westinghouse generator, there would be a breach
of the express warranty created by the description of the pro-
10. 1 N.Y.L. Rlv. CoMM'X RFP. STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
at 741-46 (1955).
11. 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
12. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 310-11 (1961).
13. Note, Limitations on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE
L.J. 723, 739 (1963).
14. 1 W. HAWxLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMME-
crAL CODE 1.190301 at 72-74 (1964) (hereinafter cited as W. HAWKLAND).
[Vol. 21
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duct. Hawkland then states that even with a disclaimer clause,
the contract could not be performed by delivery of the 1,000
KW Westinghouse generator for it would be inconsistent to
allow the disclaimer when a specific express warranty is
created. 15 If a General Electric 1,136 KW generator were de-
livered and produced only 1,000 KW, then the disclaimer would
be valid as against this breach of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability. The warranty created by the description is that
the product will conform to the description and is not a war-
ranty concerning the merchantability of the product.16 Hawk-
land then states:
A reasonable man would not take this generally stated
disclaimer to mean that the seller could perform the
contract by delivering a generator made by someone
other than General Electric or having a capacity other
than 1136 KW. The rejection of the disclaimer in this
situation, therefore, has the merit of protecting the
buyer from unexpected and unbargained for risks.
1 7
Thus, if a contract calls for the delivery of "Japanese onion
sets" it could not, under the Code, be performed by the delivery
of onion sets other than "Japanese onion sets." Therefore, if the
Lumbrazo case were to arise under the Code and the contract
contained a general disclaimer of all warranties, the sole ques-
tion would be whether or not "Japanese onion sets" were in fact
delivered. If Lumbrazo had arisen under the Code, moreover,
the express warranty of description could not be disclaimed. At
the same time the seller would not be warranting the merchan-
tability of the onion sets.
This is apparently the position adopted by the South Carolina
court in prior decisions."" In Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co.19
the plaintiff was suing for breach of warranty alleging that the
15. Id. at 73.
16. Speculation can be made, however, with respect to at what point the
failure of a product to perform becomes a breach of the warranty of descrip-
tion. For example, if the sales contract describes the product as "one 1960
Ford automobile," can the contract be performed by delivery of a 1960 Ford
with four defective wheels and a motor that will not run? The precise question
being, has the seller in fact delivered an automobile?
17. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 14, at 73.
18. See, e.g., Stevenson v. B.B. Kirkland Seed Co., 176 S.C. 345, 180 S.E.
197 (1935); Black v. B.B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268
(1930).
19. 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930).
19691 NoTs
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defendant had failed to deliver abruzzi rye called for in the
contract of sale. The defendant relied on a disclaimer clause.
The court decided that the only cause of action stated was for
breach of an express warranty. The "only questions that should
have been submitted to the jury, therefore, were: (1) Whether
or not plaintiff applied for and received rye represented to be
abruzzi rye; and (2) if so, whether the rye delivered was in
fact abruzzi rye."20 This would be the same test applied today
if a contract contained a description of the product and also a
general disclaimer.
Disclaimers are not, however, totally inoperative.21 If, for
example, a seller agrees to supply a brewer with "rustproof"
cans this warranty could be disclaimed if the disclaimer were
to read: "The seller will use his best efforts to provide cans
which will not rust but it is expressly understood that the seller
has no other responsibility with respect thereto, and it is agreed
that the buyer assumes the risk that the cans might rust."
Actually, the express warranty is not disclaimed. A more
accurate statement would be to say that in reading the contract
as a whole the description of "rustproof" cans never really be-
comes a basis of the bargain and therefore no express warranty
was in fact created. Similar results should be reached under the
195,1 version. Since the express warranty was not created, the
question of disclaiming an express warranty, an act prohibited
by the 1954 version of the Code, could not arise. Thus the con-
clusion is reached that the actual operational differences be-
tween the 1954 and 1962 version of section 2-316(1) are non-
existent. Even so, the 1962 version is preferable as it clearly
allows the parties to define terms used in the contract.
B. Disclaimer of Implied Warranties
(1) Merchantability
Generally, an implied warranty of merchantability must be
disclaimed by specific words. 22 There are, however, certain
20. Id. at 116, 155 S.E. at 269.
21. W. HAWKLAND, mipra note 14, at 74.
22. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2) (1962 version). This section
provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in the case of writing must be con-
spicuous .... Language to exclude all implied warranties of fit-
is sufficient if it states for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
[Vol. 21
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statutory exceptions to the specific wording requirement and
South Carolina has made certain changes in this area.23 Section
2-316(3) (a) of the 1962 version of the Code provides that by
the use of such phrases as "as is" or "with all faults" the
implied warranty of merchantability may be disclaimed. South
Carolina has changed this section by deleting the words "as is"
and "with all faults" and requiring that such a disclaimer may
be made by specific words only. Prior to the Code, similar
phrases were held to exclude the implied warranty of merchan-
tability. Apparently, in South Carolina there have been no de-
cided cases prior to the adoption of the Code on this point.
The court has held, however, that whether the seller intends
to warrant the product is a question for the jury.2 4
Section 2-316(3) (c) allows an implied warranty of merchan-
tability to be excluded by usage of trade. South Carolina
amended this section by the addition of the phrase "between
merchants" before "usage of trade." The Code defines usage of
trade as "any practice or method of dealing having such regu-
larity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question."2 5 Since, in order for usage of trade to
be applicable, the transaction will most likely be between
merchants, the addition of the words is somewhat superfluous.
The added language excludes, however, the situation in which
both parties are familiar with the usage of trade, but one of
them is not a merchant. Since the obvious purpose of this
change is to protect the unaware non-merchant, the general
obligation of good faith imposed by the Code26 should be ade-
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-316(3) (a) and (c) (Supp. 1966). Subsection
(a) of the South Carolina version provides:
[U]nless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by specific language which in common under-
standing calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is no implied warranty ....
Subsection (c) of the South Carolina version provides:
[A]n implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by courses
of dealing or course of performance or, between merchants by
usage of trade.
The portions in italics indicate changes made by the South Carolina amend-
ment.
24. Rodrigues ads. Habersham, 1 Speers 314 (S.C. 1843).
25. UNIFRM COMM CIAL CODE § 1-205(2). For a discussion of usage of
trade in South Carolina, see Note, Custom and Usage in Contracts in South
Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 420 (1958).
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203 (1962 version).
1969]
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quate protection of a non-merchant from a merchant who knows
the usage of the trade.
(2) Fitness for a particular purpose
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is found in
Section 2-315 of the Code. Under the 1962 version of the Code
this warranty could be excluded by section 2-316(2) by general
language which was written and conspicuous. This section stat-
ed that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
may be excluded by the use of this language: "There are no
warranties which extend beyond the face thereof." Under the
South Carolina amendment to this section, the warranty of fit-
ness can be excluded only by specific language which must be in
writing and conspicuous. If a purchaser relies upon the seller's
judgment, and the seller knows the purchaser's needs, the dis-
claimer of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
should be specific. This will avoid any surprise disclaimers.
0. Construction of Disclaimers
The last sentence of section 2-316 as amended by South Caro-
lina, says that if a sales contract has a warranty disclaimer
clause which is ambiguous, the ambiguity will be construed
against the seller.27 In today's market the seller is generally the
party with the greater bargaining power and, therefore, this
clause should not cause considerable difficulty. There are
a few situations, however, in which the buyer has the greater
bargaining power, e.g., when the product is perishable (farm
products). In such a situation any ambiguity in a warranty
disclaimer clause would be construed against the seller of the
perishable farm products.
A suggested change has been that the disclaimer should be
construed in all situations against the person with the greater
bargaining power.28 Such a change would create the problem
of proving who had the greater bargaining power. This burden
27. The South Carolina amendment to section 2-316(2) apparently is taken
from the 1952 version of the Code. This section of the 1952 version of the
Code provided:
Exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability or of fitness for a particular purpose must be in specific
language and if the inclusion of such language creates an ambiguity
in the contract as a whole it shall be resolved against the
seller . ...
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2) (1952 version).
28. When the buyer actually has the greater bargaining power, it is doubtful
that the sales contract will contain a warranty disclaimer.
[Vol. 21
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would raise an interesting question. For example, if one party
actually did not have the greater bargaining power but con-
vinced the other party that he did, who would actually have
the greater bargaining power for purposes of this Code section?
The present version of the Code avoids these problems, by
specifically setting out that an ambiguous contract provision
will be construed against an ascertainable person, the seller.
This gives the parties to a contract an indication of the manner
in which courts will construe the contract, a factor which should
be weighed before any further changes are made in this section.
IV. Pmv.ET, NoTicE REQUniEIENT, AND STATUTE OF
LnTiAxO s
A. Pivity not required under the Code
South Carolina has made several changes in the Code in
what could be called the "products liability" area.2 9 The present
version of the official Code offers three alternatives to Section
2-318's privity requirements,"° indicating that this is a policy
question. South Carolina, however, chose to adopt a fourth
version-one of its own making. Section 10.2-318 of the South
Carolina Code states that privity is no longer required for either
29. S.C. CoDEy ANN. § 10.2-318 (Supp. 1966) (privity not required for a
warranty action); § 10.2-607(3) (a) (notice not required as a condition pre-
cedent for a warranty action when personal injury is involved resulting from
the use of consumer goods) ; § 10.2-725 (cause of action for warranty accrues
when defect is or should have been discovered; also, length of time for war-
ranty action changed from four to six years).
30. The three alternatives proposed by the Code drafters are:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the war-
ranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to
whom the warranty extends.
UmFoRm Com cuAL CODE § 2-318 (1966 amendment).
1969]
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personal injury or property damage. Prior to the adoption of
the Code, the South Carolina Supreme Court had held that
privity was a requirement for an express warranty action. 1
Most jurisdictions have dispensed with the privity requirement
in cases involving personal injury but have retained the re-
quirement in cases involving property damage. This was the
position of the most extreme of the alternatives offered by the
drafters of the original Code. The South Carolina legislature,
by this amendment, has placed South Carolina in a small but
growing number of states which have abolished the privity re-
quirement for both personal injury and property damage.8 2
Section 2-318, it should be remembered, is a privity section
and does not affect warranties, disclaimers, or limitation on
warranties contained elsewhere in the Code. The last sentence
of the section states that "[a] seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section." Thus, the seller cannot limit the
persons to whom the section gives a right of recovery, but the
seller may still disclaim warranties or limit their application
within the limitations set by other sections of the Code.33 The
legislature does place one illogical limitation on this section.
The application of the section is limited to natural persons
which therefore excludes its application for corporations. Thus,
if a corporation were to sue on a warranty action, privity would
still be a requirement since pre-Code law would be applicable.
B. The Notice Reguirement for Vavanty Actions
The second change in this "products liability" area is that
in South Carolina, notice is not required in the case of con-
sumer goods if personal injury results.A4 The original version
of the Code required notice to be sent to the seller under all
circumstances. Apparently, this change is merely a continua-
31. See Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956). But
see Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d
184 (1967). See also Note, Odom v. Ford and the Prizity Requirement in
South Carolina, 17 S.C.L. RZv. 259 (1965).
32. See, e.g., Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 639, 55 Cal. Rptr.
94 (Ct. App. 1966); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D.
1965) ; Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) ; Ford
Motor Co. v. Grimes, 408 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1966). See gen-
erally Annot. 16 A.L.R.3d 683 (1967).
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (disclaimer of warranties); § 2-719
(limitation of remedies).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-607(3) (a) (Supp. 1966).
[Vol. 21
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tion of pre-Code South Carolina law. The notice requirement
was a creation of the Uniform Sales Act 5 which was not
adopted in South Carolina.
The requirement that notice be given to the seller when per-
sonal injury is involved has been criticized.36 Dean Prosser
states:
As between the immediate parties to the sale, this is a
sound commercial rule, designed to protect the seller
against unduly delayed claims for damages. As applied
to personal injuries and notice to a remote seller, it
becomes a booby-trap for the unwary. The injured con-
sumer is seldom "steeped in the business practice which
justifies the rule," and at least until he has had legal
advice, it will not occur to him to give notice to one
with whom he has had no dealing.
7
When a personal injury and notice requirement were pre-
viously considered, many courts carved out several exceptions to
the rule. Courts held that the notice provision was not intended
to apply to personal injuries,38 that it was entirely inapplicable
as between parties who had not dealt with one another as the
defendant was not the immediate seller, 89 and, that personal in-
juries were consequential damages, the right to which could not
be impaired under the Uniform Sales Act.40 One court even
held that notice given after the original complaint had been
served was sufficient, when the complaint was later amended to
allege notice.41
The notice requirement does serve a useful function when two
businessmen are involved in the sale and the breach of warranty
does not result in personal injury. For example, if the seller
35. UNIFORM SALES AT § 49. This section provides:
But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice
to the seller of the breach of any warranty within a reasonable
time after the buyer knows or ought to know of such breach, the
seller shall not be liable therefor.
36. 2 L. FRumER & M. FREIDMAN, PRoDucTs LIABILITY § 19.05[I], at 539
(1967); W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964).
37. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 679-80 (3d ed.
1964).
38. Kennedy v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121
(1923).
39. Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 416,
184 A.2d 63 (1962).
40. Wright Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E2d 713 (1956).
41. Hampton v. Gebhart Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1961).
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were to ship a carload of a product which was defective, section
10.2-607(3) (a) would require notice by the buyer of the defect
in the product. In this case the notice requirement would give
the seller the opportunity to remedy the defect and therefore
minimize the commercial loss to the buyer. Such a reason does
not apply, however, when personal injury is involved.
A caveat in this area would be that while notice is not re-
quired for personal injury, if the litigation involves property
damage in addition to personal injury, notice would apparently
still be required as to the property damage.
C. Statute of Limitations
The length of a statute of limitations is not as important as
the time at which the cause of action accrues. In section
10.2-725 the South Carolina Legislature changed the length
of the statute of limitations, from four to six years, and the
time at which the cause of action accrues for a breach of war-
ranty action. Under the original Code, the cause of action ac-
crues when the tender of delivery is made,42 except in the case
of a prospective warranty "where a warranty explicity extends
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach
must await the time of such performance."43 The original ver-
sion of the Code imposes an undue hardship upon the buyer
who purchases a product expecting it to last a lifetime when
his most effective remedy lasts only four years. Dean Hawk-
land, in discussing the statute of limitations provision of the
Code, states that the "harshness of section 2-725 may be more
fanciful than real."44 Dean Hawkland, however, is referring
to a breach of warranty of title and not to a personal injury.
When a breach of warranty for title is involved, Hawkland's
statement is true. If the buyer's claim against the seller for a
breach of warranty of title is barred by the statute of limita-
tions, then any action by a third party against the buyer in a
dispute involving title will also be barred by the statute of
limitations. In this respect, the South Carolina amendment
should be changed.
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(2) (1962 version). This section
provides:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made . ..
43. Id.
44. W. HAWKLAND, supra note 14, at 272.
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Dean Ilawkland makes no comment concerning the statute
of limitations when a personal injury is involved. In such a
situation, the harshness of the rule will be more real than fan-
ciful. Louis Frumer and Melvin Friedman, in their treatise on
products liability, state, concerning the breach of warranty for
merchantability, that "where a product is latently defective and
this is not known and cannot be known at the time of sale, a
cause of action in warranty should not accrue until the defect
is or should have been discovered." 45 While recognizing that
the majority rule is contrary, they contend that each case should
be decided on its merits with the long use of the product being
evidence of the product's merchantability rather than conclu-
sively deciding the issue on the basis of the statute of limita-
tions.
4 6
A recent New York case illustrates the harshness of a rule
that a warranty action accrues when tender of delivery is
made.47 The buyer had purchased a generator that allegedly
would last, as per a warranty, for thirty years. When the gen-
erator failed several years later, which period exceeded the
period for the statute of limitations, the buyer was not allowed
to recover because his claim was barred by the statute of limi-
tations. Another court, faced with the same factual situation,
may interpret the warranty as being prospective and allow
recovery.
The reason usually given for having the statute begin to run
at the time of the sale is to give finality to the business trans-
action. This policy reason must be weighed against other
factors such as compensating the plaintiff injured by the de-
fective product. Furthermore, should the plaintiffs suit be
based on negligence or the new emerging action of strict tort
liability, the defendant would still need the records and files
that he "destroyed" after the running of the statute of limita-
tions for a warranty action.
A further policy argument has been given:
[E]arly imposition of the bar is the desire to allow one
who has relinquished control of the agency which
45. 3 L. FRu mE & M. FRIEDmAN, PRoDucTs LIAB_ TY § 40.02[2], at 12-15
(1967).
46. Id.
47. Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 230
N.Y.S.2d 194, 184 N.E.2d 171 (1962).
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eventually causes the harm to rest assured that he is
not subject to a long delayed liability, as well as the
belief that the plaintiff's burden of proving causation,
though more onerous if considerable time precedes the
harm, is an insufficient safeguard against false claims.
These considerations, however, would have to seem
outweighed by the inequities of depriving the plain-
tiff of an effective remedy.
48
No undue burden, therefore, is imposed upon the defendant to
have the cause of action accrue at the time the breach was or
should have been discovered.
V. Misc U xious SECTIONS
A. Acceptance of Goods-Generally
The Code deems acceptance of the goods to have taken place
when the buyer signifies that the goods are conforming.49 The
South Carolina amendment, however, adds the requirement that
the notice of acceptance must be in writing to be effective. The
reason for this change was to make the time of the acceptance
more definite. One commentator on this section states that
"[a]cceptance is the mental attitude of the buyer, his indicated
willingness to be the owner of the goods, and this is likely to
be expressed solely in words as it is by other supporting
conduct."5" Another reason suggested for not requiring the
acceptance to be in writing was to allow for the unusual sit-
uation that would indicate the buyer's willingness to accept the
goods and yet would not be in writing.5 1
The apparent reason for the South Carolina amendment is to
prevent a buyer from having to use or keep goods that later
are found to be defective. This problem is unlikely to occur
due to the Code's provision for revocation of acceptance found
in section 2-608.52 If a buyer finds subsequent to his inspection
48. Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HAV. L. Rt-v.
1178, 1203 (1950).
49. UNiFoRi CommERCrAL CODE § 2-606(1) (a) (1962 version).
50. 3 R. DUESENSERG & L. KING, SALES AND BuLx TRANSFERS UNDER THE
UNiroxu COMERCIAL CODE § 2.04[4], at 2-50 (1966).
51. W. HAWxLAND, supra note 14, at 230.
52. Section 2-608 provides:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial
unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him
if he has accepted it
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and acceptance that the produce is defective, he may then, with-
in a reasonable time after acceptance revoke his acceptance and,
if he does, he will have the same rights and duties as if he had
originally rejected the goods. With this protection for the buy
er, it appears useless to require the seller to obtain from the
buyer a written acceptance for the goods.
B. Anceptance of Goods-Commeria Unit
South Carolina has also changed the time at which accept-
ance occurs if a commercial unit is involved. The original Code
states: "Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is ac-
ceptance of that entire unit."53 The South Carolina amendment
changes this section so that acceptance of a part of a commer-
cial unit is not acceptance of the entire unit.5' The Code defines
a commercial unit as "a unit of goods as by common usage is a
single whole for purposes of sale and division of which mate-
rially impairs its character or value on the market or in use."55
This definition provides the reason for the rule that acceptance
of a part of a commercial unit is acceptance of the whole. To
allow the buyer to accept part of a commercial unit and reject
the remainder may well impair the value of the commercial
unit. The legislature apparently became overly concerned with
the protection of the buyer and provided it at the expense of
the seller.
A buyer does not need "protection" when the entire commer-
cial unit is acceptable. The only time a buyer may need this
protection is when one part of the commercial unit is defective
which renders the entire commercial unit useless or depreciates
its value. The draftsman of the South Carolina amendment
apparently did not properly comprehend the operation of the
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would
be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance
was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for
it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods
which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until
the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with
regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
53. UNFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606(2) (1962 version).
54. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.2-606(2) (Supp. 1966).
55. UNIFORm COmmERCrAL CODE § 2-105(6) (1962 version).
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revocation of acceptance for commercial units found in section
2-608.ri This section allows a buyer to revoke his acceptance
of the entire commercial unit if the non-conformity of a part
of the commercial unit substantially impairs the value of the
whole unit. For example, suppose a buyer orders a card table
and four matching chairs.57 If the chairs are shipped first, and
the buyer accepts them, he will have accepted the commercial
unit. If when the table is shipped he finds that it is defective
or of a contrasting color to the chairs, he could then revoke
his acceptance under section 2-608. Thus the buyer is placed
in the same position as if he had never accepted any part of the
commercial unit, and he is protected. The seller is also protected
in that he knows that as long as he delivers non-defective goods
to the buyer, who has accepted the part of the commercial unit,
the contract will be upheld by the courts.
C. RAUCH WisE
56. See supra, note 52.
57. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(6) (1962 version). This would
qualify as a "commercial unit" because it is a "set of articles."
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